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Abstract
From free and open source software, through Wikipedia to video journalism, peer production plays a 
more significant role in the information production environment than was theoretically admissible by any 
economic model of motivation and organization that prevailed at the turn of the millennium. Its sustained 
success for a quarter of a century forces us to reevaluate three core assumptions of the standard models of 
innovation and production. First, it places intrinsic and social motivations, rather than material incentives, at 
the core of innovation, and hence growth. Second, it challenges the centrality of property, as opposed to the 
interaction of property and commons, to growth. And third, it questions the continued centrality of firms 
to the innovation process.
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Peer production is the most theoretically radical organizational innovation that has emerged from 
Internet-mediated social practice. Any economist who would have predicted in 1996 that a group of 
developers working on webserver software, using no formal managerial hierarchy and relying on a 
copyright license that gave no one exclusive proprietary control over the products of the collabora-
tion would beat Microsoft in a market that was core to Microsoft’s Internet strategy would have been 
laughed out of the room. And yet Apache beat Microsoft Server over the past twenty years, and its 
fastest growing competitor is Nginx, another free or open source software (FOSS) project. From 
FOSS through Wikipedia to video journalism, peer production plays a more significant role in the 
information production environment than was theoretically admissible, much less predicted, by any 
economic model of motivation and organization that prevailed at the turn of the millennium. Its 
sustained success for a quarter of a century forces us to reevaluate three core assumptions of the 
standard models of innovation and production. First, it places intrinsic and social motivations, rather 
than material incentives, at the core of innovation, and hence growth. Second, it challenges the 
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centrality of property, as opposed to the interaction of property and commons, to growth. And third, 
it questions the continued centrality of firms to the innovation process.
Classic theories of the firm are under severe pressure from collapsing transactions costs and the 
increasing strategic importance of incontractible aspects of innovation and problem solving. Peer 
production and open innovation more generally, flash teams, online labor markets for high- and 
low-skills, and the increasing degree to which problem-solving and innovation under uncertainty 
are central to growth questions the continued necessity of firms. Considered through the older 
theoretical lenses, classic firms appear destined to shrink towards playing niche roles where highly 
concentrated capital requirements persist and cannot be displaced by networks; or where obtaining 
and managing government-granted rent-extraction opportunities, like patents, are salient. To thrive 
beyond these confines, firms will have to reorient their strategy to assure a persistent, unique 
knowledge-based advantage. The organizational attributes of peer production suggest that this 
reorientation will require firms to emphasize cooperative continuity, which combines motivational 
diversity—the ability to harness and combine diverse motivations of talented individuals, manag-
ing the delicate balance between intrinsic and pro-social motivations and material interests, and 
social integrity—offering a shared identity and social meaning that keeps teams as persistent learn-
ing networks with long-term direct and indirect reciprocity and mutual social recognition.
Organizationally, peer production combines three core characteristics: (a) decentralization of 
conception and execution of problems and solutions, (b) harnessing diverse motivations, and (c) 
separation of governance and management from property and contract. The latter two elements in 
particular challenged received wisdom in economics. While peer production shares several attrib-
utes with the broader range of open and distributed innovation practices motivating this special 
issue, and which offer firms substantial choices and practical challenges as they manage their 
boundary in relations to this range of choices (Lakhani et al., 2013), here I emphasize the theoreti-
cal challenges implications offered by the full package of peer-production. In particular, I suggest 
a combination of transactions cost economics and the implications of tacit knowledge to explain 
the most distinct characteristics: the reliance on commons for governance, the centrality of non-
monetary motivations, and the permeation of firm boundaries.
Much of the early economic analysis of peer production focused on software (Bessen, 2006; 
Ghosh, 1998; Lerner and Tirole, 2002), but FOSS was understood by some from the start as an 
aspect of online cooperation generally (Ghosh, 1998; Kollock, 1999; Moglen, 1999). Of particular 
relevance was work that focused on the comparative advantages of peer production as an organi-
zational and institutional model of collaborative innovation and information production in bringing 
diverse individuals to bear on a problem, using diverse motivations, unencumbered by constraints 
imposed by property or managerial hierarchy. (Benkler, 2002; Von Hippel and Von Krogh, 2003; 
on the actual diversity of motivations in FOSS see David and Shapiro, 2008; Lakhani and Wolf, 
2005). The basic transactions costs theory of the firm (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1985) offered the 
foundation for the simplest transactions costs of peer production. When technology dropped the 
cost of communications, distributed the material capital necessary for knowledge work throughout 
a large population, and allowed individuals to share designs and incremental improvements with 
each other, these individuals were able to pool their knowledge and resources, and coordinate 
action toward shared goals, without the mediation of firm hierarchies or markets (Baldwin and 
Von Hippel, 2010; Benkler, 2002). Innovations dependent on high capital costs continued to be 
produced within firms, but otherwise the change in transactions costs opened the door to an alter-
native organizational form.
Transactions cost theory alone does not, however, explain the rise of non-monetary motivations 
for many of the most successful distributed innovation projects, or the successful separation of 
contract and property from governance in the most prominent success stories. MTurk or Uber are 
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equally a product of the reduction of transactions costs as peer production, where market signals 
harness well-defined material motivations to provide work through more efficient markets. 
Crowdsourcing like MTurk is incapable of producing innovation, however, instead using the low 
transactions costs to harnesses simple human labor applied to well-defined tasks. Distinguishing 
MTurk from FOSS as an organizational model cannot, therefore, depend on a transactions costs 
theory. It requires a theory of knowledge production and learning as well. In this, peer production 
shares the core insight of open innovation, user innovation (Von Hippel, 1988, 2005), sociological 
research on innovation networks (Powell, 1990, 1996) and innovation clusters (Gilson, 1999; 
Saxenian, 2000), and even broader work on the commons (Ostrom, 1990).
Innovation is a collective, not individual process. It is a process of learning, and therefore 
depends crucially on communication. Because there is a gap between the depth and extent of com-
munications and connections within the human brain and the communications between human 
beings through language, the process of knowledge production and learning is always lossy. 
Knowledge is always at least partly tacit. It is therefore sticky, local, and social. No matter how 
detailed a memo a twenty-five year veteran of a firm will leave her successor, the successor will 
not have the same knowledge of the firm’s dynamics as the retiring veteran. von Hippel’s work on 
user innovation is the easiest example to grasp. Over decades, von Hippel and others have shown 
that the diversity of challenges and requirements presented to users in the real world are too diverse 
to justify firms investing in solutions. As a result, users solve problems and innovate, and only after 
a class of uses and solutions is defined do firms enter to “productize” the solution, once its charac-
teristics are reasonably well-defined. But similar dynamics that make pricing and managing inno-
vation and knowledge work difficult are present in academic-market collaborations, in open 
innovation, and in peer-production.
Because knowledge is tacit, it is difficult to elicit fully with property or contract mechanism, 
and with hard economic incentives. Processes necessary to standardize knowledge and insight into 
packets that can be traded in markets or fully supervised in firms are “lossy”: they lose information 
about the nature of the problem to be solved, the individual and inter-personal attributes that make 
a particular solution to the problem best executed by this particular team or that, along these par-
ticular lines or those, etc. Commons, by contrast, are better at eliciting non-monetary motivations, 
both intrinsic and extrinsic-social, like status. This is due to the well-documented phenomenon of 
motivation crowding out (Bowles and Hwang, 2008; Bowles and Polanía-Reyes, 2012). Intrinsic 
and social motivations are powerful, but unlike extrinsic motivations, particularly monetary incen-
tives, do not require the explicit accounting that makes market- and hierarchy-based mechanisms 
lossy. By “commons” I mean a family of institutional mechanisms that eschews exclusive control 
over property, and utilizes a diverse range of social governance mechanisms to manage the utiliza-
tion of resources and projects other than property and contract (for a review of the relationship 
between the literature following Ostrom, 1990 and the work on Internet commons, cultural com-
mons, etc. see Benkler, 2013). Our experience with FOSS success in enabling collaboration among 
paid and unpaid contributors to commons-based innovation suggests that combining the two is not 
impossible, but it is quite clear that doing so requires a separation between property and contract 
that enable the payment on the one hand, and the governance of the project on the other hand. It 
also requires substantial investment in community management and understanding the social pro-
cesses of the commons-based community, an investment quite distinct from the investment neces-
sary for managing a price-mediated or hierarchically-organized enterprise.
As a result, organizations, communities, or networks of actors of diverse forms aiming to pursue 
innovation are faced with several tradeoffs in how to organize and manage their efforts. The more 
routine the tasks involved in the process, and the more fungible the knowledge and skills necessary 
for the tasks are, the more appropriate standard “incentives” are to motivating contributions, and 
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the more complete a role market-based incentives can play in eliciting effort. The more knowledge 
intensive, creative, and complex the problem is, the more lossy these hard incentives will be, and 
the more important it will be to use a form that elicits diverse pro-social motivations. This tradeoff 
mirrors the tension between firms’ focus on efficiency and exploitation of existing knowledge and 
their capacity to pursue exploratory innovation (Benner and Tushman, 2003). But when consider-
ing innovation as a broad social system, as opposed to the internal tensions within an organization, 
it emphasizes the systemic tensions between models of organization whose comparative advantage 
is in exploitation and efficiency, and those whose advantage is in exploration and experimentation. 
In its most familiar form, this understanding explains the comparative roles of academic science 
relative to commercial R&D. Similarly, the more uncertain the project space, or the answer to the 
question “what shall we do”? “where shall we search for a solution?” the more important explora-
tion of a possibility space, low-cost experimentation across a wide range of opportunities and 
diversity of knowledge-carrying contributors applying themselves to the question is. Hence the 
importance of user innovation in spaces that solve as-yet unknown needs. By contrast, the better-
understood a space is, the more a firm can focus on optimization—in von-Hippel’s framework, the 
firm can “productize” the outputs of user innovation, or in the case of FOSS, firms can focus on 
implementing and services that optimize the space developed in a free software community. 
Institutionally, that means that as knowledge development and production are more important, in a 
space that is at the outer frontier of knowledge and problem-solving, the more important it is to 
adopt an institutional framework that assures freedom to operate, a commons, whereas the more 
certain and understood the problem space is, the more firms in the space can focus on appropriation 
of the fruits of investment. All these factors are, as discussed above, constrained by capital cost and 
communications cost, and are limited to those instances where capital costs are sufficiently low, or 
capital investment sufficiently widespread in the population (as with personal computers), to 
permit a distributed, commons-based strategy to operate effectively at a scale appropriate to the 
problem at hand. Figure 1 maps various open innovation and peer production strategies on a three-
dimensional space. The X axis defines the degree of uncertainty associated with the question of 
what project any group of people, firm or otherwise, should pursue given opportunities and capa-
bilities available, where the origin defines well-understood opportunities, and uncertainty increases 
away from the origin. The Y axis defines the human resources necessary for a project. At the origin, 
the skills, knowledge, and insights needed to pursue a project are routine and well defined, and the 
axis moves toward states in which the human resources necessary are more knowledge intensive, 
tacit, creative, diverse, and hard to standardize. The Z axis describes the material capital necessary 
for effective production of a given project, where near the origin the capital investment necessary 
is high and concentrated, and the axis moves our toward situations where effective production by 
a given group of people, on a given set of project, can be pursued with low capital investment or 
with capital investment that is distributed in the hands of potential contributors to the project. The 
three dimensional space offers an initial explanation of the mixed approaches we have in fact seen 
develop in our knowledge production system, and perhaps explains the highly-visible role that 
commons-based peer-production has had during the turbulent, fast-moving first three decades of 
Internet innovation.
This framework also allows us to place many other observed practices of the past decades.
Crowdsourcing (Howe, 2006) is the phenomenon most often confounded with peer production, 
whose clearest instance is Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk). It is distinct from peer production 
because the tasks it involves are narrowly pre-specified by the task designer. It leverages the same 
transactions costs reduction features, but only those, and does not leverage the knowledge-produc-
tion characteristics of peer production that make diverse motivations and collaboration central. The 
critical distinction between crowdsourcing and peer production is in the location of conception of 
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tasks and solutions. It described situations where the task is conceived and defined by a given 
entity, and then put out to distributed individuals whose actions are limited to performing the pre-
conceived task. It harnesses undifferentiated human labor, rather than the diversity of judgment, 
creativity, experience, tacit knowledge, or talent. From an organizational perspective, crowdsourc-
ing represents a relatively small innovation. It harnesses thousands of independent contractors to 
perform pre-specified tasks; but does not affect governance or ownership, restructure innovation or 
learning, or generally harness any new motivational vectors. As a strategic matter, “crowdsourc-
ing” is relevant where cost-reduction, rather than distributed exploration and innovation, is the 
goal, and technology does not allow capital investment to replace labor.
Online labor markets use the low transactions costs associated with online knowledge work to 
allow firms to harness distributed talent from around the world. Upwork at the high end or 
TaskRabbit at the lower end are well known examples. They represent a significant improvement 
in the efficiency of markets for skilled and unskilled labor, but do not shift conception from the 
buying firm to the external expert. They challenge the continued role of firms from a transactions 
costs perspective, but they do not present a clear alternative for innovation strategy.
Prize systems like TopCoder, Innocentive, or Kaggle, provide platforms for general purpose or 
field-specific competition and prize systems to be deployed to harness creative problem solving 
effort towards problems posed by firms or governments. Unlike online labor markets, they empha-
size decentralization of conception and execution, leaving task design to a distributed pool of 
innovative, skilled workers and entities. Because prize systems pay for outcomes, not effort, from 
the firm’s perspective they afford wider and more diverse experimentation with alternative solution 
approaches than online labor markets. This, in turn, allows them to capture extreme value solutions 
in areas where the problem definition and path of execution are highly uncertain. (Boudreau et al., 
Figure 1. Three-dimensional map of open innovation and peer production strategies.
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2011). However, they do this by externalizing the costs of experimentation to the participants, 
harnessing distributed knowledge and expertise in a relatively wasteful model for non-winning 
efforts. Because of the status framing of “prizes,” they also sometimes harness non-monetary, par-
ticularly status-oriented, contributions. While defining a prize system still requires quite explicit 
and complex definition of what success or failure entails (Burstein and Murray, 2016), it nonethe-
less is able to harness efforts that are not constrained toward definitions sufficiently crisp for pric-
ing or managerial command.
Open collaborative innovation, by contrast with these online models, is the least dependent on 
changes in transactions costs. It reflects instead changes in theories of knowledge production and 
problem solving. These practices developed among firms in various complex product and innova-
tion-rich markets for a while, although they have gotten a boost from networked communications 
(Chesborough, 2003; Gilson et al., 2008, 2010; Powell, 1990, 1996). They can be complements or 
substitutes for peer production, depending on the degree of control a firm wishes to exercise over 
the solution developed. A firm facing a complex software development problem could enter into 
relational contracts with several of its suppliers or even competitors, adopt open standards at the 
core of its strategy, and place some of its workers in other firms and receive those of others in its 
own as part of an open collaborative strategy. In the alternative, that same firm could partly develop 
the software it requires and license it as FOSS and use Sourceforge or GitHub to manage the 
repository. In the former case, the firm would be engaged in open collaborative innovation. The 
latter would be the firm engaging peer production. Open collaborative innovation shares with peer 
production the recognition that the best people to solve a given problem are unlikely to work for 
the firm facing the problem, and that models of innovation that allow diverse people, from diverse 
settings, to work collaboratively on the problem will lead to better outcomes than production mod-
els that enforce strict boundaries at the edge of the firm that undermine collaboration based on fit 
of person to task rather than based on employment contract and ownership of resources associated 
with the problem. These overlaps in the theory of knowledge production create strong overlaps 
between open collaborative innovation and peer production from policy perspectives, primarily in 
implications for intellectual property. But because this category does not include the separation of 
ownership from governance and management, it limits participants to those who are part of a set of 
mutually-cooperating firms, and does not necessarily leverage non-monetary motivations. It trades 
off manageability and appropriability for diversity and search space. Interestingly, this framework 
also helps to explain the dynamics of Silicon Valley or Kendall Square—the town-gown collabora-
tions—as well as the relatively informal culture, the strong emphasis during the period of high 
innovation rates in the first thirty years of Internet innovation on growth not revenue, and the 
strong cultural shifts to accepting and embracing failure among entrepreneurs. All these features of 
start-up culture in the United States and Israel in particular contribute to looser accountability and 
high degrees of low-cost experimentation driven by mixed motivations.
While peer production is developing into a field in its own right, its implications for economics 
and organization theory are broader than the phenomenon itself. These include the uncertain future 
of the firm, the integration of intrinsic and prosocial motivations into models of human behavior, 
and the integration of open commons into our understanding of growth.
Coase’s theory of the firm was based on transactions costs. Because transactions costs existed, 
firms developed and grew up to the point where the cost of allocating resources to projects through 
managerial hierarchies exceeded the cost of doing so in the market. Williamson’s adaptation added 
monitoring of agents who acted under self-interest with guile. When transactions costs are more-
or-less eliminated, technology for monitoring every keystroke and contribution is ubiquitous, and 
innovation depends as much on prosocial and intrinsic motivations as on extrinsic motivations 
appropriate for agents who act under self-interest with guile, what role, if any, remains for the firm?
270 Strategic Organization 15(2)
The decline in transactions costs puts severe pressure on the need for a firm. Online labor mar-
kets like Upwork offer early examples of spot markets for high talent where a firm is trying to 
manage projects that require more diverse knowledge than its present employees possess. A more 
ambitious version suggests the possibility of developing a more general organizational strategy in 
the form of flash teams: teams of experts who can assemble for a given task, and then disassemble 
and move on to other tasks. (Retelny et al., 2014). On-demand economy sites like Uber or 
TaskRabbit suggest that the model of market clearance of routine labor from end consumers to 
workers is also becoming very low friction, and information systems are replacing managerial 
control for monitoring and quality control. These most recent developments are examples of mar-
ket transactions displacing what would once have been the function of a firm—collecting, vetting, 
and training a team, and then managing it through completion of a task, and delivery to a customer. 
Both Upwork and more routine on demand labor platforms are primarily extensions of existing 
models of independent contracting, improved by the dramatic reduction in transactions costs. A 
decade ago, John Seely Brown and John Hagel (2005) emphasized that the ability to orchestrate 
“creation nets” was “the only sustainable edge”. At the time, the orchestration still focused on 
orchestrating firms in global supply chains anchored in open innovation as collaboration among 
firms, small and large. But as online labor markets combine with peer production to make conceiv-
able, if not force, a fluid global market in labor and talent, the question runs much deeper. What 
continues to be the role of the firm where transactions costs are low enough to allow “orchestra-
tion” of networks of resources to be the sole remaining function of a firm? And if talent pools and 
knowledge resources can be orchestrated for particular projects, why is orchestration itself not a 
role that can be fluid and ad hoc?
One possible answer is that firms will remain significant only where physical capital costs of 
production are high and concentrated. Even this limitation, however, may be less limiting that it first 
appears. Current experience with semi-conductor foundries suggests that very high capital costs 
lead to concentration of manufacturing, while still leaving of R&D, patenting, and branding in the 
hands of other firms. This is largely the relationship between a foundry like TSMC and Qualcomm. 
The question, from the perspective of the theory of the firm, is what role will Qualcomm continue 
to play, even if TSMC’s role in continuing to optimize high-capital-cost production is safe? The 
answer may be that the cost of prosecuting and licensing patents, or managing demand through 
control of brands is sufficient to justify keeping R&D and intellectual property within a single legal 
boundary of a firm, but it is far from clear at a theoretical level what advantage such a legal monop-
oly-based firm would have, from the innovation perspective, over a flash team that rapidly designs 
the next generation chip, and then uses the foundry to capture the rents through first mover advan-
tage without incurring these larger costs. One option for answering the question about the future of 
the firm, then, is that firms will continue to play a role (a) when they have the advantage in amortiz-
ing high capital costs over many diverse innovation efforts where optimization of that innovation 
and its manufacture and distribution are core necessities (this is the direct implication of Figure 1), 
or (b) when exploiting legally-created rent extraction opportunities gives an advantage to a continu-
ous legal entity such as a firm over a more fluid market relationship that comes together purely for 
the purposes of exploration and innovation. This creates the possibility of multiple equilibria, where 
legal regimes that open the possibility for commons-based production elicit innovation that does not 
need regulatory protection and the rents it enables, and that moves rapidly outside of the boundary 
of firms, while legal regimes that do create rent-extraction opportunities create firms to develop 
innovation along lines optimized to capture those rents, and further invest in securing the rent-
extraction institutional devices. The continued role of firms in innovation, in this context, becomes 
contingent and path dependent, rather than efficiency- or growth-optimizing in a social welfare 
sense. (For one evolutionary model along these lines see Landini (2012)).
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Another possible answer about the future of the firm comes from the second implication of peer 
production—the centrality of pro-social and intrinsic motivations. Parallel to Williamson’s concept 
of monitoring, a firm that is particularly good at creating a culture that will be better at eliciting and 
focusing pro-social and intrinsic motivations on a given class of projects than a loose network of 
peers will have an important and persistent role to play. If “absorptive capacity” as a concept 
implied a stable boundary of the firm, and learning inside the firm that allowed its internal players 
to understand and take advantage of externally developing innovation, then we could think of 
“cooperative capacity” as the idea that a firm could maintain its coherence in the face of vanishing 
transactions costs if it is able to harness diversely motivated individuals to work in a persistent 
social relationship. Motivational diversity overcomes the problems of contractibility and monitor-
ing, while social integrity permits sufficient interaction and learning feedbacks over time for 
knowledge to emerge within the networks of people who are part of the firm that is unique relative 
to knowledge outside the boundary of the firm, knowledge that gives the firm its distinct advantage 
over ad hoc networks of innovation and production. Theoretical frameworks like shareholder value 
or agency theory strove to achieve efficiency by creating a level of alienation between organiza-
tions and the people who made up these organizations. The separation was necessary in order to 
permit ever-more efficient markets to manage and harness human effort, displacing earlier models 
based on human relations, long-term loyalty, or efficiency wages. By contrast, a model of motiva-
tion that assumes that belonging to a socially-meaningful interaction is critical for engaging the full 
capacities of people suggests a continued role for firm that can integrate social meaning and rela-
tions into their organizational ethos and practice. In other words, here peer production joins diverse 
lines of research that suggest that “high-road” strategies that invest in building the firm as a col-
laborative community are preferable to more transactional or efficiency-driven firms, but it sug-
gests further that in the presence of substantially lower transactions costs and competition from 
nimble, flash organizations and non-market innovation, building communities of meaning around 
economic collaboration is the primary form of strategic advantage firms have over dynamic, fluid 
networks of collaborators.
The role of social motivations also reflects more generally on the practice of economic mod-
eling of human behavior. Extensive work in diverse disciplines over the past quarter century has 
established that human populations exhibit substantial pro-social motivations, and that they 
respond to a range of non-material, non-self-interested motivations ranging from reciprocity to 
group identity through, in some cases, altruism (Camerer and Fehr, 2004; Fehr and Gintis, 2007; 
Ostrom, 1998). Moreover, these motivations are powerful enough to lead subjects consistently to 
behave in ways that contradict predictions of the standard rational actor model. As the sorry expe-
rience of stock option executive compensation schemes has amply demonstrated, the rational 
actor model can make a poor predictor for the real world effects of major organizational interven-
tions (Bebchuk and Fried, 2006). Finally, extrinsic rewards generally, and monetary rewards in 
particular, crowd out intrinsic and social rewards, so that any institutional arrangement aimed at 
optimizing for material rewards will have predictably negative effects on those non-material 
rewards, whether intrinsic or extrinsic (Bowles and Hwang, 2008; Bowles and Polanía-Reyes, 
2012). Once we come to understand that much of human effort directed at exploration and 
advanced innovation has to be driven in large measure by intrinsic and social motivations when 
innovation speeds up and uncertainty is high, it becomes clear that both patents and clear firm-
based extrinsic rewards can have a negative impact on innovation, and that the most exploratory 
forms of innovation will need to live outside of firms and market-mediated activities. Organization 
theory and economics need to learn how to design not better “incentive schemes” as they were 
traditionally understood, but how to manage competing systems of motivations, that cannot be 
maximized additively but must instead by balanced and managed culturally so that increases in 
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one, relatively easy domain—pay or material reward or punishment—does not undermine intrin-
sic and socially motivated contributions either within a firm or from complementary efforts on 
whose innovation a firm depends.
Finally, from a broader institutional analysis perspective, the successful emergence of peer pro-
duction requires a re-evaluation of the role of property rights as an institutional driver of growth. It 
is hardly controversial to state that growth depends critically on innovation. Economists have long 
emphasized the costs of patents, or property-like entitlements, to innovation, given the public goods 
nature of information goods (Arrow, 1962). The experience of the past twenty five years around the 
Internet and the World Wide Web has underscored that tension. The success of FOSS in particular 
underscored that rapid innovation in the software and communications industry has meant that 
commons-based innovation outpaced proprietary innovation. Free and open-source licensing and 
open standards optimized the freedom to operate and rapidly experiment, adapt, and implement 
innovation cycle, rather than focusing on securing appropriation of the benefits of slower moving 
change. But the role of commons has not been limited to the case of strict public goods. Open spec-
trum in particular has been the most surprising area where a potentially congestible good has shown 
more innovation and market adoption when treated as a commons (WiFi and similar bands) than 
as property (mobile licenses). Across diverse industries from smart grid communications through 
healthcare to inventory management and even mobile data, spectrum commons, rather than prop-
erty, has innovated faster and captured larger market share than has proprietary spectrum (Benkler, 
2012). More generally (see Benkler, 2013), once one accounts also for public highways and roads, 
major international shipping ways, as well as common-carrier or public utility infrastructure like 
electricity or water, the idea that property, as opposed to a mixed infrastructure of property and com-
mons, is the foundation of growth, is due for a major revision.
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